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of Agricultural and Applied Economics.POTEN’HAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER
AND I:rsCONTROL IN m-m UN-LTED STATES$~
E. H. McCauley and W. B. Sundquist
Tilepossibility that African Swine Fever (ASF)~:’could be introduced to the
U.S. is approaching reality due to the recent outbreaks in Brazil and, more
threateningly, in the Dominican Republic. The disease became widespread in
these countries within a period of only a few months. Simply by its nature of
hi~h case fatality (50 to 95 percent) and the present inability to develop a
vaccine against it, ASF is truly one of the most economically dangerous of
animal diseases. Given the threat close to us, we are now in the position of
having to take some action. By having an understanding of the potential impact
of ASF for U.S. producers and consumers, decision makers can be assisted in
allocating funds and taking other actions witllill a framework of predicted
economic consequences.
This brief report presents estimates of the ecc)nomic impact of ASF in the
U.S. under three conditions (scenarios) of control strategies which encompass
several possible situations following a hypothetical introduction of ASF:
Scenario 1: A small outbreak or series of outbreaks which are controlled
and the disease successfully eradicated in a sl]ort time by
immediate slaughter and sanitary disposition of pigs on
infected and exposed premises :indby stringent quarant.i.ne of
a relatively small area followed by thorough on-going
surveillance.
Scenario 2: Widespread outbreaks which resulr in the quarantine of a
larger area (one state) and for a longer time (three years),
while an eradication program i.scarried on.
;:The study reported here was conducted with the financial and technical support
of APHIS, USDA. The authors alone, however, are responsible for the content
of thj.sreport.
1/
— African Swine Fever (ASF) i.san acute disease of swine. Certain wild pig
species are .inapparent carriers and the disease may be transmitted by certain
ticks . The virus causes signs very similar to HOg Cholera and is the only
strain of a class that infects mammals. The other members of this class
infect insects and reptiles. ASF was restricted to Africa until recently
when it has spread to Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Cuba, Brazil, Dominican
Republic and Haiti. In France and Italy,,ASF has been eradicated. The signs
of the disease: acute fever, hemorrhage in all tissues and generally death in
a few days, result from the virus damaging the integrity of the vasculature.
‘There is no treatment or preventive vaccination for ASF.
One of the practical problems with the disease is that Hog Cholera and ASF
are easily confused in the early stages of an outbreak. The consequences of
ASF are so much more grave, so that if the resolution of this confusion is
not achieved and proper control measures initiated promptly, a disastrous
epidemic could result.2
Scenario 3: The situation in which the U.S. has to “live with” enclemicASF,
at least for several years, under cc)nditions of a prosram to
reduce its incidence such as :isdone in Spain now, or as was
done in the U.S. and Gieat Britain, in working toward the
eradication of Hog Cholera.
SCENARIO .L: THE SUCCESSFULLY KRADI.CATED SMALL OUTBRIiA~ ———
Outbreaks of ASF have been controlled and the disease eradicated by
immediate slaughter and quarantine in France (1961, 1962, .1963and 1974), in
Italy (1967), and in Cuba (1971). As for these countries, this method of con-
trol is clearly the first option for the U.S. and not uxlLil it becomes evident
that such an approach is infeasible would it be abandoned.
In light of the population of Dominicans in New York (some 400 thousand)
and Miami (some 200 thousand), it seems reasonable to postulate that ASF might
first be introduced near these cities, possibly through some pork product being
brought in from the Dominican Republic. The seriously high degree of this
possibility can be appreciated by considering the travel of people between the
U.S. and the Dominican Republic and other countries of I,atinAmerica. Table 1
shows data for 1976 as reported by the U.S. T.mmigration Services for all ports
of entry.
Table 1
TRAVEL OY PEOPLE BETWEEN THE U.S., THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC




Type of Travel. Repub].ic Countries Brazil America
—— .——..—.. .—-
Temporary Visitors
to the U.S. 60,688 329,892 99,784 41.0,218
Immigrants Admitted
to the U.S. 12,.526 67,39.3 1,038 22,699
.--–.—-—_————_d _—.—— — —
In addition to this type of travel,,data from the U.S. Customs shows that a
total of 415,922 people returned to U.S. airports from the Dominican Republic in
1977.
In 1976, the U.S. suecessiully eradicated HogjCholera from outbreaks in New
Jersey, Massachusetts and Rhode Islarrd. Because of tl~epotential similarity of
location circumstances and the similarity of Hog Cholera disease with ASF, this
experience probably provi.dcs the best basis for estimating the economic impactof the successfully eradicated small outbreak. In that program, the U.S. spent
$2,934 million to indemnify owners of sacrificed pigs and approximately $2,2
million in other program costs. The program took about five months during which
time 24,038 pigs were depopulated on 17 confirmed infected and 43 exposed premises.–-
~/
If we accept the hypothesis that an ASF outbreak would have smiliar technical
dimensions as the liogCholera eradication campaign, then the program cost to the
U.S. to eradicate it would be at least $5.1 million and in all probability higher
since t“hequarantine and survei.1.lance procedures would have to be more stringent
because we can expect countries which import our pork products to request us to
be more thorough in the eradication of ASF than of Hog Cholera. The greater
resistance of the ASF virus itself and the possibility that tick species capable
of being reservoirs and vectors of the virus exist in North America as they do
in Spain and East Africa are important additional reasons to expect control pro-
grams to be more stringent and costly than those against Hog Cholera. To account
for this, we have arbi.trar.ily doubled the program costs to $4.4 million which
results in an estimate of about $7.3 million to successfully eradicate a small
outbreak of ASJ?.
There would be some temporary upset to the business operations of the
affected producers ancleven to some producers not directly affected by the
disease. Consumer pork prices would probably not be affected in a major way.
We would, however, likely lose all or most of our pork product export market
temporarily. The heaviest impact on U.S. exports of pork and related products
would occur if the disease became endemic (Scenario 3). And, we have provided
an estimate of the magnitude of this potential impact in considering the
endemic situation later in this report.
Other adverse economic effects, perhaps more significant than the loss of
pork product exports, could result from restrictions on export sales of other
agricultural products. Presently, countries which buy our grain require us to
certify that we are free of l?oot-ancl-Mouth Disease, E.inde.rpest and Contagious
Pluero Pneumonia. Also, states in the U.S. are supposed to have an affidavit
on file that grain products come from areas that are free of a variety of other
diseases such as Anthrax and Bluetongue. If ASF were to be introduced, we could
expect that this restrictive mechanism would be tightened. It is difficult,
however, to project che degree of restriction and the dimensions of its effect
on export sales of [J.S.agricultural products.
SCENARIO 2: F,KADICATION BY QUARANTINE OF A LARGER AREA —
For analysis pertaining to this situation, we have assumed that outbreaks
are so numerous and widespread in a large area that.an entire state has to be
quararltined for three years. DUring the first year, 20 percent of the pigs are
depopulated becaase they are on infected or exposed premises. This is reduced
to five percent the second year and none the third year. ‘rl)us , the third year
is a surveillance year needed to assure that eradication has been achieved.
“Youn~, S.H. and Walker, J.W,, “Status of the State-Federal Hog Cholera
Eradication Program.” U.S. Animal Health Association Proceedings of the
80th Annual Meeting, 1976.4
The State of “Minnesota was selected as the geographical entity for this estimate.
And, though the cluarantine might more probably occur for an east coast state or
states rather than for Minnesota, the seriousness of this size of an outbreak in
economic terms is well exemplified by the Minnesota case. Table 2 shows the
expenditure amounts estimated for quarantine, surveillance, depopulation and
indemnity should ASF become widespread in Minnesota.
Certainly, there would be other adverse economic effects on producers and
agri-business firms in Minnesota and even nationally. Some producers would
shift production output to cash crops and other livestock. There would be in-
direct (secondary) losses to agri-business firms, for example, in the form of
reduced feed sales and pork marketing, processing and retailing. In general,
however, these effects would be transient. And, national consumer prices for
pork products should not be greatly affected by this situation. Serious ques-
tions must be raised, however, as to the technical and po].itical feasibility of
containing one state under such an intense eradication program. As in all three
scenarios which we have considered, there would be an adverse effect from loss
of export markets.5
Table 2
ESTIMATED DIRECT COSTS TO ERADICA’I’E AFRICAN SWI:NEFEVER IN MINNESOTA
DEPOPULATION AND QUARANTINE OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD*
-— —
cost Item and Descriptio~
(mi.lli.on dollars)
A. QuaranLi.ne –
(personnel, vehicles, barriers, ccc.) $ 7.542
B. Depopulation -
20 percent in the first year, 5 percent in the second year,
and O percent i..n the third year. 984 thousand pigs based
on 1.977inventory. Estimates include cost to bury carcasses
and disinfect premises.
C. Indemnity –
Based on average market price (1977) of $64 per head for
pigs slaughtered
1).Surveillance -
District, state and federal personnel for a three-year
period in which time 25 percent of the pigs are
serologically tested
1?.Laboratory Diagnosis of Samples -
25 percent of pigs depopulated @ $2.50 per sample
1?.Diagnostic Service Cost of samples taken at slaughter






Total Direct Costs $151.615
-.
‘+Calculated kJyDr. John New from his study of costs to eradicate Foot-and-Mouth
Disease by quarantining a seven–state area as part of the Study for Potential
Economic Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United States. Dr. New makes





Depopulation costs include costs of diagnosis, premise quarantine,
appraisal., carcass disposal, cleaning, disinfection and final inspection.
Indemnity figures include cost of payment to producers for animals
destroyed, but not.cost of destruction.
The indemnity figure is “commercial slaughter price” for all hogs
slaughtered and does not include a price premium for breeding animals
(including purebred hogs) for which there are no market price quotations.
The per head indemnity figure is affected significantly by the high
incidence of piglets and lower weight classes in the total hog population.
The 2.5percent rare of serologic. testing for surveillance is based on
the intensity of such surveillance as carried out in the 1976 outbreaks
of Hog Cholera in New England.6
SCENAR:[O 3: ENDEMIC AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN THE U.S .— .— _——&
Many aspects of the sit.uati.on of endemic ASF which we have analyzed here
can be l.i.kened to the historical situation when Hog Cholera was endemic in the
Us. The econom:ic consequences of ASF are much more serious, however, because
of rhe need for more intensive surveillance, diagnostic and quarantine proxrams.
Also, the swine production industry now interacts much more intensively (than at
the time of endemic Hog Cholera) with a broad agri.-business sector and U.S.
agricultural exports have increased several fold to their current level of over
$25 billion annually.
Assumptions: —.
The epidemiologic conditions leading to the endemic ASI?situation would
probably be that the disease would have become so rapidly widespread that
eradication efforts would be overwhelmed. We have assumed that the initial
year of the endemic period would beonein which high losses due to the disease
itself would occur in the U.S. swine population. In tl]eyears following this
initial.year, we assume that a control program would be in effect aimed at
reducing incidence of the disease and that at some point the incidence would be
low enough to make the.start of an eradication effort feasible.
Economic impacts for endemic ASF are assessecl for two situations; one
requires a five-year duration for control programs and the second requires 10
years. For both situations the initial year results in infection of 20 percent
of the swine herds in the U.S. with a 50 percent average fatality. No indemnity
program is in effect for this initial year. In years two and three a control
program i.sin effect and losses are reduced to two percent of the swine popula-
tion. These losses are mainly clueto depopulation of infected and exposed herds
and are indemnified. In years four and five (for both situations) 0.8 percent
of the swine population is indemnified. In the case of the 10-year control
program, this 0.8 percent indemnification rate continues through the 10th year.
All losses from disease or indemnification (and destruction) are assumed to
occur once during the year to any herd involved and apply equally to all age,
weight and sex categories of swine.
In our judgement, there are potentially four major economic impacts deriving
from endemic ASl?. These are:
(l.)Production and (possibly) income losses to swine producers and related
agri-business firms~
(2) Direct program costs associated with surveillance, diagnosis, depopu-
lation, disinfection, quarantine and indemnity programs,
(3) Loss of export markets for pork and related products and
(4) Losses to consumers in the form of (a) higher retail prices far pork
and related products and (h) reduced consumer choice.After the initial year of losses due to the disease, major producer losses
are compensated for through inclemni[icationpayments and the economjc 10.S.SCLS of
agri-business firms are not great with swine population losses of only two per-
cent or less. Even during the first year, aggregate losses to producers in the
form of annual death loss may be largely offset income-wise by the higher per
unit prices resulting from reduced supplies of pork. Also, reduction in col]-
sumer choice (aside from that due to the impact c~fhigher prices) is not sub–
stantial after the inirlal year. And , since supplies of some substitutes,
particularly poultry, will.be.increased quickly in response to higher prices,
even the consumer price impacts occur mainly in year one of the disease. As a
result of the above considerations, we believe Chat the major economic impacts
of endemic ASF are captured under t.lle following three categories: direct control
program costs, loss of export markets and higher retail prices to col~sumers.
Direct Program Costs: —
Estimates of direct program costs are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
ESTIMATED DIRECT CONTROL PROGRAM COSTS OF 5-YEAR
AND 1O-YEAR ENDEMIC AFRICAN SWINE FEVER SITUATIONS
.—.— — —
Item and Description cost — —.
(million dollars)
> Years 10 Years —. ——
A. Surveillance, diagnosis, quarantine and clepopulation~- 78.6 196.6
B. Indemnity costs2 211 362
——. .—
Total.Direct Costs 289.6 558.6
—- — —..——— —.——.—
1
Based on doubling the costs of Hog Cholera eradication program
2
Based on an estimated annual U.S. swine population of almost 58 million animals.
The 5-year program involves indemnification of about 3,25 million head of swine
and the 10-year program about,5.5 million head.
The cumulative value of total direct program costs is estimated to be
$289.6 mi.lli.on for the five-year program and $558.6 million for the 1(1-year
progranl.Impact on Consumer Prices: ——..—. .-.. —-.
[t is estimated that an initial year loss of 1.0percent of the U.S. swine
population would result ~.nabout a 12c per pound increase in the re~ai.1price of
about 12,330 million pounds carcass weight 0[ pork. ‘I’his results in an expected
increased retail.cost to consumers for pork products of $1,.48billion in tl~at
year. ‘Thisestimate is based on the demand elasticities incorporated in an
annual economic model of the U.S. Livestock sector. In addition, retail prices
of substitute products, particularly beef, are estimated to increase by an amount
of about $600 million in this initial year for a total increase in consumer
prices of over !$2billion. Because of the ability to increase production of
substitute meat products, particularly poultry, increased consumer costs at
retail would drop to about .$75million per year i.nyears two and three and would
average only about $10 million [or the remaining years. The cumulative value of
these increased retail prices for pork and substitute products totals to about
$2.25 billion for the five-year endemic situation and $2.3 billion for the 10-year
situation with most of the price increase in the first year of the endemic disease
when death losses in swine are high. In the event that export markets for pork
and related products were lost as a result of endemic ASF, some, but not al~j Of
the supplies normally entering export markets would be diverted to the domestic
retail market. This would effectively reduce prices in this market and shift a
part of the losses from U.S. consumers to lJ.S. producers in the form of lower hog
prices.
Impaccs on Export Markets: —. —. —..—-
Export marlcets for U.S. pork and related products would be adversely
a[fected to some extent by even a small.outbreak of ASF in the U.S. [Ale have
estimated such losses, however, only for the endemic ASF scenario. On the
assumption that we could export little, if any, pork should ASF become endemic
in the U.S.9 the cumulative value of losses in exports of pork and related
products is estimated to be more than $1.5 billion for the five-year endemic
ASF situation and more than $3 billion for tl~e10-year situation. The biggest
single. loss item in exports is fresh and frozen pork for which annual. exports
are currently in the $200 – $250 million range. Pork livers and pork offals
are also major export items running i.nthe $30 - $40 rnil.lion per year range
and lard exports are slightly higher at $35 - $40 million. Processed pork
products such as ham, bacon, cured pork, etc., are fairly minor export items.
In addition co the loss of exports for pork and related products should tfSF
become endemic in the U.S., some countries, parti.cular].y those with a domestic
swine population of their own, are likely to place.partial or complete embar~oes
on the imports of other agricultural products from the U.S. for fear that these
products may serve as carriers of ASF to their swine populations. Though it is
clifficult to isolate and quantify the magnitude of such potential I.osses,U.S.
agricultural exports, among which grains, soybeans, cotton and animal products
predominate, currently total to about $25 billion annually. With this large
do.1.lar volume they constitute a major factor in total lJ.S.exports and in the
a~gregate b,alance of trade for the.U.S.9
BENEFIT-COST APPRAISAL
It is clear that because of the large size of the lJ.S. swine production
inclustry and the large volume of domestic consumption and export marketing of
porlcand related products, economic impacts of endemic ASF will quickly run into
the billions of dollars. In fact, the impact of endemic ASF in terms of higher
consumer prices alone i.sestimated at $2.25 billion or more. In addition, a
large (possibly a multi-billion dollar) loss c)fexport markets would need to be
absorbed ‘by che U.S. economy. Other things equal, this major loss in exports to
the U.S. would increase our trade deficit beyond its current level and thus,
would further increase domestic inflationary pressures.
One procedure for evaluating the benefit-cost ratio for controlling ASF in
the U.S. is to compare the Net Present Value (NPV) ratio of program benefits to
program costs. This can be done by computing Che Net Present Value of the long
term impact of letting the disease become endemic and comparing t~}s impact with
the Net Present Value of the cost of individual control programs.—
In Scenario 1, the successfully eradicated small outbreak, total program
costs ($7.3 million) occur in the first year. If successful, this control pro-
gram generates benefits with an estimated NPV of $4.9 billion by avoiding the
adverse effects of the 10-year endemic ASF situation (Scenario 3) along with its
major program costs, consumer price impacts and losses of export markets. This
generates an extremely high benefit-cost ratio (670).
In Scenario 2, the ~JetPresent Value of program costs for a successfully
managed one-state, three-year program total to $144.4 million. Matched against
the same value for the Net Present Value of benefits as for Scenario 1, the
bene[it-cost ratio is still very high (about 40).
The benefit-cost ratio for Scenario 3 (endemic ASF) is more difficult to
calculate because major program costs occur simultaneously over an extended
period in conjunction with the price impacts and export losses resulting from
the disease. Even with these and other complications, however, one can be
assured that a control program against endemic ASF would have a highly favorable
benefit-cost ratio because program success, if achieved at the end of year 10,
would match a total estimated NPV of losses from the disease of $4,280 million
against a total NPV of program costs of slightly over $600 million. Thus, the
economic returns to expenditures for control programs to eliminate ASF, should
it become endemic, are of the magnitude of several hundred percent.
APHIS is presently engaged in efforts to keep ASF out of the United States.
These activities include increased customs surveillance at ports of entry, in-
creased awareness through information programs, a higher priority for ASF
research in the U.S., and technj.cal assistance to and monitoring of epidemiologic
ASF situations in Caribbean and South American countries. In addition, certain
-..——
3’Assumes an annual discount rate of 10 percent and assumes that the major con-
sumer price impacts occur in the first year of the disease but that export
losses continue throughout the 10-year period. These are rather simplified
.assurnptions regarding a very complex phenomenon. But, they do provide a
[easihle framework for estimation of the general magnitude of the benefit--cost
ra~.ios for control programs.10
~.nternational development agencies, particularly IJSAID, IDB, PAHO and UNDI’/FAO
are initiating support for ASF control efforts in ASF endemic countries. There
is a need for more basic information on vector transmission of ASF virus and tl]c
immunologic aspects of the host-parasite relationship leading to the possible
development of a vaccine or other ways of producin~; immunity to ASJ?. Research
efforts in other countries, such as Spain and Kenya, where the disease is endemic
and qualified scientists have been working with these problernst justify :l~t:~?ntion
and support. All of the aforementioned efforts to prevent ASF from occurring in
the United States are well. directed and can be reasonably expected to yield high
returns to investment.11.
APPENDIX A ——. —.—.-—
E. H. Mc.Cauley
Notes on the Epidemiologic. and Economic Aspects of African Swine Fever
Outbreaks in Spain, Brazil, Dominican Republic and Cuba
SPAIN -—..
Spain has been carrying out a control program against African Swine Fever
(ASF) since 1960. Conditions and financial resources and the high incidence
ASl?in Portugal have not allowed an eradication effclrt to take place. Under
control program, the pigs on the outbreak premises c~rgroup of premises are
slaughtered and disinfection and quarantine measures carried out. Certain
dimensions of their situation are shown in the table below:~/
of
the
Pig Number Indemnity Progran#’
Population of Cases Pigs Paid cost
Year (Jooo ‘s) (Outbreaks) Slaughtered_ (Pesetas) (Pesetas) ——
1.974 8,308 233 1.76,000 /+17,500,000” 25,516,256
1975 7,865 683 205,300 529,500,000 67,936,256
1976 8,838 1,115 150,000 317,500,000 42,396,256
In an interview with Drs. Prieto and “Marcos, they estimated that it
presently costs Spain about one billion pesetas per year~/ ($14.3 million) to
run a program in which some 350 thousand pigs have to be slaughtered annually
from some 1200 outbreaks per year in a swine population of 10 million head.
Further, they think that they could eradicate ASF from Spain (the major source
of ASF spread in the world, they say) under a rigorous six months, selected-area
depopulation effort at a cost of 10 billion pesetas ($143 million). The major
part of that would be for indemnification at a rate of 90 percent of market
price rather than the 40 percent now paid which is causing producers “to hide”
the disease. Costs of repopulation and indirect losses are probably not
included in this estimate.
J/
--Taken frcm memo of Dr. Reichard to Dr. Mou&on, tcl.egram from Ag Attache, Madrid,
to Dr. Reichard and memo of Dr. Gray to Dr. Mulhern.
2./progr:~lIl cOStS are the sum of 1.20pta./pig i.ndeml~i.fied for diagnostic service;
2,7:L8,000pta./yr. for personnel salaries; 1,191,300 pta./yr. for per diem;
486,956 pta./.yr. for ve~licles.12
4/
DOMINICAN REPUBLf.C- .—
Information from the recent spread of AS!?i.nthe Dominican Repub]. ic is
scarce. Apparently the disease was introduced in early 1978. It is presently
unknown if ASF has occurred in Haiti, bu~ tl~isseems to be a likely possj.bility.
By early September 1978, there had been 90 confirmed outbreaks in various loca-
tions and slaughter and quarantine measures are being carried out. ‘1’he
epidemiologic data associated with these outbreaks and the control effort are
scarce and presently effc~rts are being made Lo collect such data. ‘l%eproblem
is complicated by the inauguration of a new president who inherits a problem
which the previous administration didn’t deal with promptly. There was con-
fusion in the minds of che new administration officials at various levels about
what their policy should be regardless of the cost or source of funds. They
51 for indemnification and owners are paid with “bonos” allocated 10 million pesos-.
(promissory instruments). Since then, they have prepared a plan calling for
slaughter of pigs on infected and exposed premises and for depopulation of pigs
in a five kilometer area surrounding such outbreaks. There is indication that
financial and technical assistance will be provided by certain international
development organizations.
One interesting aspect of the problem there is that many of the people are
afraid to eat pork even though it is widely publ.ici.zed that ASF does not infect
humans. The market Price has dropped some ~0 to 50 percent in recent weeks>
depending on location and class of pig. The previous price was 1.20 pesoslkg
for a No. 1 market pig and about 1.00 pesos/kg for a lesser quality pig.
At this Cime che questions of “What to do?” “HOW much will it cost?” “How
much is i.tworth?” and “~o’s going to do it?” are paramount. on a preliminary
basis, a brief framework of the economic consequences of three options was pre-







Pig population - two million head. The census shows 1.4 million, but
field personnel think it is higher mainly because of the number of pigs
that are managed on a scavenging basis by the poorer farmers that were
not counted accurately in the census. On the other hand, some people
think it may be closer to one million head.
Level of :indemnification - about 50 pesos per pig “across the board.”
Eradication program costs - 10 million pesos.
Repopulation costs - 10 million pesos.
Incidence and case fatality of endem:icASF with no control. program -
20 percent of all pigs per year infected wj.th 50
Al
Based on findings during a visit to ~ominican Rc:public
11-18, 1978.
5/ —. The official exchange rate is one peso for one dollar.
percent case fatality.






Incidence and case fatality under a Spanish type of control program -
200 thousand pigs infected per year with 100 thousand case fatalities.
This loss would be mainly in undetected outbreaks on premises of the
poorer pig owners. Because of significant differences in basic infra-
structure, such a program is estimated to be effective only for about
half the pig population. For this estimation it is assumed that this
half of the pig population is owned by small holders who have from one
co 1.0pigs. They may have one or two sows farrowing from three to 12
pigs per year or a few weaner pigs in their backyards. I.nthis one
million pig population held by some 400 thousand small holder families
there could be outbreaks on 20 percent of the locations or in 200
thousand pigs per year with fatality of 100 thousand pigs.
Number of pigs slaughtered and indemnified under Spanish type of control
program - 35 thousand headlyear.
in the case of pigs held by commercial farmers (25 to 400 pigs per
premises; total of 600 thousand pigs) and larger producers (400 to
17,000 pigs per premises; total of 400 thousand pigs), the pigs on out-
break and exposed premises would be slaughtered and the owner indem-
nified. If we take 1/10 of the 350 thousand figure estimated by
Spaniards, t’hen35 thousand pigs would be slaughtered per year.
Cost of a control program similar to that in Spain - 2.9 million pesos
per year. Roughly estimated as 1/5 (the relative pig population) of the
$14.3 million estimated by Spanish officials.
~uBA~/
1971, outbreaks of ASF occurred in the province of Havana. The Cubans
out a successful eradication campaign by way of an immediate and rigor-
ous quarantine of Havana province and sacrifice of some 430 thousand pigs,
.
followed by a period of surveillance and clean-up and the repopulation. Some of







20,351 pigs on premises infected by ASI?were slaughtered and buried.
Prior to this, 12,173 pigs on these premises died of ASF.
205,652 pigs were sacrificed and eaten by their owners. The heads,
viscera and bones were buried in many cases.
29,923 pigs on state farms were sacrificed.
177,670 pigs were indemnified and processed into canned and sterilized
meat by the state.
Census figures showed 463,322 pigs in Havana province.
.—
$/
These brief notes were taken from “Reporte
Procino Africano in Cuba” by the Instituto
Habana. ~U~y 25, 1971..
Prelirninar de].Brote de Fiebre
National de Medicina Vet.erinaria, .1 f,
ASF was found on a farm and then in the slums near Rio de Janeiro in May
1978. Evidence indicates that the virus was introduced from garbage from the
airport being fed to pigs. Since that time, ASl?has been “tentatively” confirmed
i.neight states of Brazil and ic is generally conceded that ASF is out of control
there and that it will be endemic for the foreseeable future. In certain areas
where commercial producers predominate it is conceivable that a “disease-free
zone” approach might be carried out.
-.
J_/
From Dr. Bob Page and the draft report of the FAO/PAHO Emergency Consultation





Notes on the Epidemiol.og.ic
Control and Eradication in
H. McCauley
and Economic Aspects of Hog Cholera
the United States and Great Britain
These notes were collected from various sources in the process of establishi-
ng bases for estimates of the economic consequences of African Swine Fever
introduction to the U.S.
A. From the estimate used in the PPB program prepared by various APHIS






Prior to the start OS the eradication program in 1960-1962, losses
to producers are estimated at $50 million per year for death loss and
costs of vaccination ($40 nlillion/year).
In 1962, there were 4,195 suspicious outbreaks. Of these, 70 percent
are judged to be confirmed. It must be taken into accounc that
unreported outbreaks occur due to limitations in reporting. It is
estimated that two times the confirmed outbreaks represents a reason-
able estimate of actual outbreak numbers.
In infected herds a 75 percent mortality rate is estimated.
In 1965, when most states were in Phase 11 of the eradication program





B. From the USDA/ARS
the U.S.” 1962.
191.3and 1926, extensive outbreaks with greater than
occurred. The 1896 outbreak caused losses of 13
pigs in the U.S.
“Supplement to the History of Hog Cholera Research in
Fourteen counties in 14 states were surveyed under conditions of
no-program in 1912 and then under an experimental program of providing
free Hog Cholera serum administered by Bureau of Animal Health vet–
erinarians in 1913, 1914 and 1915.
—. .—.—
Hogs Died
Year Hogs Raised from Hog Cholera Percent Died
1912 856,910 152,236 17.7
1913 1,052,408 179,125 17.0
1914 .1,1.21,229 59,863 5.3
1.915 1,334,644 30,965 2.2
__.——. --16
‘l’he results demonstrated the benefits of a concerted control program.
[Howeverj it was concluded to be impractical to extend it to larger por–
tions 01 even one state.
C. From “An Economic Evaluation of -tile Swine Fever Eradication Programme in
Great Britain” by Peter R. Ellis, Ulli.versi.ty of Reading.
1. It was concluded that the average mortal.i~y attributed to Swine Fever
(Hog Cholera) among all pigs on premises during Hog Cholera outbreaks
including those born or moved during the quarantine period, was 20.4
percent.
2. Between 1955 and 1962 about one percent of pig l~olcling premises had
confirmed outbreaks of Hog Cholera and Hog Cholera was confirmed on
such holdings at an annual rate of 0.2 holdings per 1.000pigs in the
total popul.arion.
3. From 1920 to the year 1947, the year when crystal violet vaccine was
first permitted to be used, the confirmed Hog Cholera outbreaks
occurred at an annual rate of 0.21 outbreaks to 1.38 per 1000 pigs
in population. Information on the number of pigs affected by each
outbreak was not available. .
4. Beginning in 1951, better data on the number of pigs per holding
became available. During the period of 195S to 1962 (while vaccina-
tion was still being permitted), the annual. rate o.fpigs on holdings
with confirmed Hog Cholera outbreaks ranged from 1.48 to 6.34 pigs
(in 1962) per 1000 pigs in total population.
5. Under the eradication program during the 1963 to 1966 period, the
total number of confirmed cases (premises on which Hog Cholera had
been confirmed) dwindled from 1,243 to 25 per year. No outbreak
occurred after 1966 until one was confirmed in 1971 and none has
occurred since then.
6. Based on the analysis used in this study, the eradication approach
used during 1963-1966, compared to two less rigorous hypothesized
programs, yielded a benefi.t- cost ratio of 4.03:1 and 2.62:1 for a
projected period of 1963 through 1975.APPENDIX C ————...
E. H. NcCauley
State and Federal Hog Cholera Eradication
Program and Indemnity Costs: 1962-19761
Indemnity Paid
Total in Addition to
Program Costs only Program Costs


















Data supplied by APHIS.
2
Prior to 1970, there was considerable variation among
states as to their status in Hog Cholera eradication.
From 1970 to 1976, most states were in the same
eradication phase. Therefore, the figures for this
seven-year period, 1970 through 1976, are considered to
represent the costs of a uniform national program
against Hog Cholera. The annual average state and
federal program costs (not including indemnity) for this
period are $9,830 million.
Program costs are expenditures for accomplishing the
various activities of inspection, diagnostic services,
quarantine, slaughter, surveillance, exposed animal
traceback, carcass burial and garbage inspection. The
specific amounts for each activity varied from year to
year depending on the epidemiologic situations existing18
at different times. ‘1’o a degree, this variation is due
to the number of outbreaks and pigs slaughtered and
indemnified. However, as can be noted by the indemnity
costs > many of these activities had to be carried out
even though indemnification payments were low. This
reflects the need to maintain epidemiologic surveillance
in the final stages of an eradication program to assure
that the large investment in previous years is protected,
i.e., that the virus has been eradicated from the envir-
onment and that outbreaks don~t start occurring again
due to lack of vigilance. These activities are being
continued.19
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